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MEDIATING INTERACTIONS IN AN EXPANDING INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME
Laurence R. Helfer
The last few years have been a particularly heady period for
governments, private parties, and non-governmental organizations
("NGOs") seeking to develop new rules to regulate intellectual property
("IP") protection standards. During that time, a slew of lawmaking
initiatives, studies, and reports have been launched in a strikingly large
number of international venues. Work on intellectual property rights is now
underway in intergovernmental organizations such as the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO"), and Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAO"); in negotiating
fora such as the Convention on Biological Diversity ("CBD") and its
Conference of the Parties and the Commission on Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture; and in United Nations expert and political bodies
such as the Commission on Human Rights and the High Commissioner for
Human Rights.' In some of these venues, IP lawmaking has involved the
negotiation of new international agreements. In others, IP norms are being
generated through the reinterpretation of existing treaties or the creation of
nonbinding guidelines, resolutions, and other forms of soft law.2
This essay views these myriad developments through the lens of the
international relations theory of regimes.3 It uses the insights of regime
theory to make three basic points. First, it explains why IP lawmaking has
broken out of the confined institutional spaces of established international
IP fora, such as WIPO and the WTO, and has expanded into a broad and
t Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. An earlier version of this essay
was presented at the Conference on the Future of the International Intellectual Property at
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, held on March 26, 2004. My thanks to
Peter Gerhart for inviting me to present a paper at the conference. © 2004, Laurence R.
Helfer.
1 For a detailed analysis of these developments, see Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting:
The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 23-47 (2004) [hereinafter Helfer, Regime Shifting].
2 For illuminating discussions of the role of nonbinding norms in international law, see
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). For an international relations perspective on soft
law, see Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421 (2000).
3 See generally ANDREAS HASENCLEVER ET AL., THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
108 (1997); INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); Stephan Haggard &
Beth A. Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 491 (1987).
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growing array of other international venues in environmental law, human
rights, and public health.4  Second, it shows how this recent expansion
helps to enrich regime theory itself by illustrating how regimes evolve over
time and how they interact with institutions and actors in other issue areas.5
And third, it describes a working typology of the different modes of
interaction that are developing among the many international venues in
which IP lawmaking is now occumng.
L International Regimes and Intellectual Property Protection Standards
Regime theory was developed by political scientists in the early 1980s
in reaction to the then-dominant realist paradigm of international relations.
7
Realist scholars assert that international rules and international institutions
are epiphenomenal-that is, they exert no independent influence on the
behavior of nation states. In response to realists' claims that these rules
and institutions were all but irrelevant to how nations behave, regime
theorists sought to demonstrate that states can derive substantial benefits
from cooperating under conditions of relative anarchy. These benefits
include reducing transaction costs, creating property rights, increasing
access to information, monitoring state behavior, mediating disputes, and
sanctioning noncompliance.
9
In addition to identifying the causal factors that could lead self-
interested states to create international regimes, these early regime theorists
made two principal contributions to understanding how nations behave.
First, they revealed that states satisfy their demand for international rules
and institutions not only through legally binding treaties and formal
organizations, but also through softer forms of interaction, such as non-
binding declarations and informal government networks. Thus, Stephen
Krasner's foundational article, Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences, defined regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors'
4 See infra Part I.
5 See infra Part II.
6 See infra Part III.
7 See generally, ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DIScORD IN
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).
8 See, e.g., Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 545,
562-64 & n.92 (2004).
9 See William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 240-56 (1997) (reviewing the benefits of state cooperation
through international institutions); see also KEOHANE, supra note 7, at 107 (stating that the
"most important function" of regimes "is to facilitate negotiations leading to mutually
beneficial agreements among governments").
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expectations converge in a given area of international relations." 10 This
conceptual framework for analyzing interstate cooperation was far more
capacious than the rule-orientated, doctrinal approaches favored by
international legal scholars.
Regime theorists also had a second goal-to explore whether regimes,
once formed, actually altered state behavior. Because regimes are created
by states, it would be logical to assume that they could survive only so long
as their benefits outweighed their costs to the governments involved. But
political scientists showed that international regimes are often sticky. Their
sunk costs, and the time and effort needed to create alternative institutions,
discourage states-even powerful ones-from killing off or abandoning
those regimes already in existence." In the language of international
relations theory, this stickiness causes regimes to function as "intervening
variables" that independently influence state bargaining patterns and their
resulting policy outcomes. 12
Given the constraints that regimes impose, what strategies have states
and non-state actors used to tailor existing regimes to more accurately
reflect their interests? One important strategy is "regime shifting," i.e. "an
attempt to alter the status quo ante by moving treaty negotiations,
lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting activities from one international
venue to another."
13
In the area of intellectual property, the most well known example of
regime shifting is the successful effort by the United States and the
European Communities ("EC") to move certain IP protection standards
from WIPO to the WTO, a move manifested in the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"). 14  But the
strategy of IP regime shifting has many earlier antecedents, such as the
United States' promotion of the Universal Colrright Convention as an
alternative to the Berne Convention in the 1950s, or developing countries'
10 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983)
(emphasis added).
11 KEOHANE, supra note 7, at 102 (discussing ways in which international regimes
embody "sunk costs" for states that explains "why they persist even when all members
would prefer somewhat different mixtures of principles, rules, and institutions").
12 Krasner, supra note 10, at 1.
13 Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 1, at 14.
14 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS].
15 See Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright-Past,
Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1060-65 (1968) (discussing the history of the
Universal Copyright Convention and its ratification by the United States).
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campaign to establish a "New World Information and Communications
Order" in UNESCO in the 1970s.
16
The unqualified success of the United States and EC in linking
international trade and intellectual property rights in TRIPS has encouraged
scholars such as Peter Drahos to argue that regime shifting is a game that
only powerful nations can play.17 In fact, however, the post-TRIPS era has
seen the emergence of a less well known second wave of regime shifting,
this time by weaker developing countries that are increasingly dissatisfied
with many provisions in TRIPS (or its omission of other issues) and are
actively seeking out ways to recalibrate or supplement the treaty by
relocating IP lawmaking initiatives to other international venues.
11. Revising Regime Theory: Evolution of and Interaction among Regimes
and the Strategy of Regime Shifting
The existence of regime shifting by both powerful and weaker states
raises intriguing questions. For example, exactly how could a strategy of
regime shifting allow developing countries and their NGO allies to mount
challenges to the TRIPS Agreement? And what did these states and non-
state actors hope to achieve by developing new intellectual property norms
in fora not previously concerned with the products of human creativity or
innovation?
Regime theory offers only limited guidance to answer these questions.
In particular, the existing literature on how regimes evolve over time is
under-theorized. Such limited writings as exist assume that each
international regime is discrete and governs only a single issue area (such as
trade or human rights) without formal or informal relationships to other
regimes. 19 What regime theorists have not fully considered is how actors
respond when these clear boundary lines begin to erode through linkages of
16 Peter Billing et al., State Characteristics and Foreign Policy: Industrialized Countries
and the UNESCO Crisis, 28 COOPERATION & CONFLICT 143, 143-44; see also JOHN
BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 569 (2000) (noting
influence of developing countries in UNESCO, and quoting UNESCO official who stated
that "the organization tended to consider the issue of copyright from the perspective of
users").
17 Cf BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 16, at 565 (stating that "forum-shifting is a
strategy that only the powerful and well-resourced can use").
18 See Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 1, at 53-62.
19 Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation
and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in EFFICIENCY, EQUrTY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE




formerly distinct regulatory subjects.2° With the growing prevalence and
importance of these linkages, even less powerful states and non-state actors
are becoming more adept at strategically shifting negotiations to those
international venues that better serve their interests.z "
To flesh out these theoretical points, consider first what post-TRIPS
intellectual property regime shifting could not do. It could not, at least as a
formal matter, alter the obligation of developing countries to implement
TRIPS standards into their national laws. Nor could it function as a back
door way to denounce TRIPS (or, to be more precise, the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations to which TRIPS is annexed). 22 To the contrary, developing
countries remain at risk of WTO dispute settlement proceedings-and
WTO trade sanctions-if they fail to adopt the IP protection rules that
TRIPS requires. But if regime shifting strategy could not directly
undermine TRIPS, it could be used indirectly, first to generate what
international relations scholars have referred to as "counterregime norms,"
and then to integrate those revisionist norms into the WTO and WIPO.
23
The value of counterregime norms for developing countries is
grounded in two fundamental characteristics of the international legal
system. The first is the disaggregated and nonhierarchical structure of that
system, and the second is the frequent use of nonbinding norms to guide the
behavior of states and private parties.
With only a few exceptions, there are no clear hierarchies among
international legal rules. Nor is there a supreme international judicial body
or legislature with the power to comprehensively reconcile inconsistent
rules or balance competing policy goals.24  The absence of strong
20 For illuminating discussions of linkages with an emphasis on the WTO, see generally
David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5 (2002); Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional
Linkage: Transcending "Trade and... ", 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (2002).
21 Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 1, at 16-17.
22 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, at art. XVI, para. 5, 33 I.L.M. 1140, 1143 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/03-fa-e.htm.
23 See Donald J. Puchala & Raymond F. Hopkins, International Regimes: Lessons from
Inductive Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 61, 66 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983)
(defining "counterregime norms" as norms formulated by the "disadvantaged participants"
in a regime and "which either circulate in the realm of rhetoric or lie dormant as long as
those who dominate the existing regime preserve their power and their consequent ability to
reward compliance and punish deviance"); Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 1, at 14
(defining "counterregime norms" as "binding treaty rules and nonbinding soft law standards
that seek to alter the prevailing legal landscape" by "contest[ing] established normative
orthodoxies").
24 See Laurence R. Helfer, Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal System, 37
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 193, 205-213 (2003).
2004]
CASE W. RES. J. 1NT'L L.
hierarchies or of a centralized interpretive authority means that international
lawmaking is often a messy business. But this messiness also creates
strategic opportunities for states to advance competing approaches to the
same subject in different international venues.
States often turn to soft law as a way to advance their preferred
approach to a contested legal issue. At first, this claim may appear
implausible. Why, after all, would states choose a method of lawmaking
that by definition does not create legally binding commitments? But soft
law can have advantages for governments, especially weaker governments,
seeking hope to challenge the status quo. It is superficially less threatening
to powerful states than hard treaty law. And it is easier and faster to create
as compared to the often difficult and time-consuming process of
negotiating new treaties.25
But over time, soft law can have hard-edged consequences. It can
serve as a focal point for gathering and exchanging information. It can help
to reshape interests and preferences. And it can generate a rich set of
principles, norms, and rules to challenge existing legal paradigms. 26
In the wake of TRIPS, developing countries used regime shifting in
precisely these ways, exploiting the disaggregated, nonhierarchical
structure of the international legal system to create new and sometimes
inconsistent norms in different international fora.27  But developing
governments did not stop at simply generating new rules and new conflicts.
They used those rules and conflicts as the fuel for efforts to renegotiate
legally binding intellectual property obligations in the WTO and WIPO.
Substantial empirical evidence supports this integrationist use of
regime shifting.2 8 During the last three years, developing countries have
used a variety of entry points in the WTO and WIPO to draft literally
dozens of jointly authored proposals to modify intellectual property
25 See Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 1, at 56-58, 72-75.
26 Id. at 58-59.
27 For informative discussions of how to reconcile conflicts among the rules of public
international law with a focus on the WTO, see JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2003); Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coherence in International Law: Praises for the
Prohibition Against "Clinical Isolation " in WTO Dispute Settlement, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct.
1999, at 87.
28 See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Council for TRIPS, The Relationship Between the
TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) - Checklist of Issues:
Submission from Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru, Thailand, and Venezuela, WTO Doc.
IP/C/W/420, at para. 2 (Mar. 2, 2004) (stating that "[m]ore than 25 communications and
papers have been submitted by [WTO] Members on the" relationship between the CBD and
TRIPS); see also Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 1, at 63-71 (providing additional




protection rules. These proposals were not generated in a vacuum; rather,
they expressly rely on soft law resolutions, recommendations, and
guidelines initially adopted in the environmental, public health, and human
rights regimes.
This integrationist regime shifting strategy has also helped developing
counties to increase their bargaining power within the WTO and WIPO.
Coalescing their demands around proposals first generated in other regimes
facilitated a proactive negotiating strategy in which governments worked in
groups - like the "Group of 21" that formed at last year's WTO Ministerial
meeting in Cancun - and stuck to predetermined proposals for reform.3 °
Perhaps more importantly, reliance on these proposals changed the
nature of developing countries' legal arguments. It allowed these countries
to argue that the revision of intellectual property rules is not a self-
interested ploy to distort free trade or free ride on foreign creators or
inventors, but rather part of a rational effort to harmonize nominally
inconsistent legal obligations and normative objectives. This shifted the
terms of the debate and allowed these countries to draw support from a
wide array of actors and institutions to support their reform efforts.3 '
111. Mediating Interactions among Actors and Institutions in an Expanding
International Intellectual Property Regime
So what has changed now that the principles, norms, and rules of
intellectual property protection are being generated in multiple international
venues? Treaty amendments, soft law standards, dispute settlement, and
29 See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Council for TRIPS, The Relationship Between the
TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Protection of
Traditional Knowledge, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/356, at para. 11 (June 24, 2002).
30 See The WTO Under Fire: Why Did the World Trade Talks in Mexico Fall Apart? And
Who is to Blame?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2003, at 26-28; but see Peter Drahos, When the
Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the WTO 24-31 (2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author) (noting the disadvantages as well as the advantages of
group-based bargaining by developing counties in the WTO).
31 Most notably, the European Communities and their member states have developed
proposals to harmonize competing principles, norms, and rules that are sympathetic to
developing countries' demands for reform. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament and the Council, The Implementation by the EC of the "Bonn
Guidelines" on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-sharing Under the Convention on
Biological Diversity, COM(03)821 final, available at http://biodiversity-
chm.eea.eu.int/information/F 1046684686/F 1058442682/F 1070869838/indexhtml?pp = l;
European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, Communication by the European
Communities and their Member States to the TRIPS Council on the Review ofArticle 27.3(b)
of the TRIPS Agreement, and the Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore: "A Concept Paper", (Sept. 12, 2002).
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national legislation are all important factors. But new interactions and
linkages among actors and institutions merit special consideration.32 In the
international intellectual property regime, these include: (1) granting the
secretariat of one intergovernmental organization observer status in another
organization, (2) establishing formal and informal partnerships between
organizations to share information and lawmaking tasks; and (3) increasing
cooperation and competition among actors and institutions engaged in
intellectual property lawmaking. This section illustrates these points with a
few examples.
A. Observer Status in the TRIPS Council and in WIPO
One way to influence intellectual property lawmaking is by
participating as an observer in other intergovernmental organizations.
Granting an intergovernmental organization "observer status" within a
particular body of the WTO, for example, confers a defined set of
privileges. Representatives of the organization may attend the meetings of
the body, receive copies of all documents submitted to it, and may, upon
invitation, address the body orally.33 The right to speak does not, however,
include the right to circulate apers or to make proposals . ..nor to
participate in decision-making. '  But although denied these important
avenues of institutional voice, organizations with observer status will be on
hand to provide legal and technical advice to governments both inside
WTO negotiating rooms and in the all important hallways outside.
Given these potential avenues of influence, it is not surprising that
applications for observer status have triggered significant political disputes
in the WTO. Members often disagree over the propriety of granting such
status to a particular organization, and the guidelines for grantinf such
status are flexible enough to permit plausible competing arguments. The
32 Interest in linkages has been especially acute for the WTO, which Jos6 Alvarez has
described as a "linkage machine." Jos6 E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 146 (2002).
33 General Council, Guidelines for Observer Status for International Intergovernmental
Organizations in the WTO, WT/L/161 (July 25, 1996) [hereinafter Guidelines for Observer
Status].
34 Id. at 8.
35 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FImsS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
36 Guidelines for Observer Status, supra note 33, at 4 (requests for observer status are
considered on a case-by-case basis, "taking into account such factors as the nature of work
of the organization concerned, the nature of its membership, the number of WTO Members
in the organization, reciprocity with respect to access to proceedings, documents and other
aspects of observership, and whether the organization has been associated in the past with
the work of [GATT]").
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political debates on this issue have become especially acute after the
November 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference, as WTO members debate the
procedures to be used for negotiating revisions to WTO Agreements.
37
This contentious atmosphere also pervades observer status applications
to the TRIPS Council. The Council has granted observer status to the FAO
and ad hoc observer status to the WHO, but applications from the
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity ("CBD") since July
2000 have been repeatedly ignored.38 Opposition comes from the United
States, which asserts that the CBD Secretariat does "not have a broad
interest in TRIPS issues. 39  More recently, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, supported by the Sub-Commission for
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, expressed the intention to
apply for observer status.4°
In comparison to the WTO, observer status in WIPO is significantly
less politicized and easier to obtain. Not only are the formal criteria for
granting observer status more open-ended than in the trade organization,41
37 According to an April 2002 statement by then WTO Chairman Mike Moor, members
have been unable to reach agreement on a number of observer status issues. Chairman
Reports on Consultations About Acceding Countries' Participation, Observers, WTO NEWS
(Apr. 17, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news02_e/
tnc 24april02_e.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) (arguing in favor of observer status as a way
to promote "efficiency, transparency and coherence" of WTO lawmaking).
38 See Annual Report (2002) of the Council for TRIPS, IP/C/27, at para. 3 (Dec. 6, 2002)
(listing intergovernmental organizations granted TRIPS observer status); TRIPS Council
Meeting Ends in Gridlock, BRIDGES WKLY NEWS DIG. (Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable
Dev., Geneva, Switzerland), July 4, 2000 (noting TRIPS Council's grant of WHO's
application for ad hoc observer status and stating that applications from other international
organizations, including CBD, remain pending); see also Convention on Biodiversity,
Decision VI/24, Access and Benefit-sharing as Related to Genetic Resources, Sixth Ordinary
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, held at
The Hague, Netherlands, Apr. 7-19, 2002, at para. D (section title: "Other Issues Relating to
Access and Benefit-sharing"), available at http://www.biodiv.org/decisions/
default.aspx?m=COP-06&id=7198&lg=0 [hereinafter Decision VI/24] (noting that CBD
"has still not been granted observer status" in TRIPS Council).
39 Trips Council Sets Agenda for June Meeting, BRIDGES WKLY NEWS DIG. (Int'l Ctr. for
Trade & Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switzerland), May 22, 2002 at 7, 8.
40 Report of the High Commissioner on the Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, U.N. Econimc and Social Council,
52nd Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, at para. 68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June
27, 2001) [hereinafter High Commissioner Report]; Res. 2001/21, Sub-Commission on
Human Rights, 16th mtg., at para. 9, U.N. Doc. E/LN.4/sub.2/RES/2001/21 (2001)
[hereinafter 2001 Sub-Commission Intellectual Property Resolution] (requesting High
Commissioner to seek observer status "with the World Trade Organization for the ongoing
review of the TRIPS Agreement").
41 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO): General Rules of Procedure, WIPO
Pub. No. 399 (FE) Rev. 3, Rule 8(2) (1990); see also Intergovernmental Committee on
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but they have been applied very expansively. For example, the
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore42 has granted observer
status not only to intergovernmental organizations from the biodiversity,
PGR, health, and human rights regimes, but also to dozens of international
and national NGOs, increasing the ability of non-state intergovernmental
actors to influence negotiations among WIPO members.43
B. Formal and Informal Partnerships and Information Sharing
Mechanisms
A second mode of interaction among international actors and
institutions in the international intellectual property regimes takes the form
of formal and informal partnerships in subject areas of shared competence.
In some cases, these partnerships are mandated by treaty; in others, more
informal relationships arise on an ad hoc basis, as the activities of the two
organizations become increasingly interlinked.
An example of treaty-based collaboration is found in Article 68 of
TRIPS, which directs the TRIPS Council to "seek to establish . . .
appropriate arrangements for cooperation with" WIPO.44  The result of
these efforts was a 1995 Agreement between WIPO and WTO.45 The
Agreement requires the two organizations to share information received
from their respective members relating to intellectual property laws and
regulations; mandates that each organization provide technical and legal
assistance to developing countries that are members only of the other
organization; and delegates to WIPO certain administrative functions
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Rules of
Procedure, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/2, at para. 8, n.3 (Apr. 5, 2001) ("[E]ach body
[in WIPO] shall decide, in a general way, or for a particular sessions or meeting, which other
States and [intergovernmental] organizations shall be invited to be represented by
observers.").
42 For a detailed review of the IGC's work and supporting documents, see
http://www.wipo.intltk/en/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2004).
43 See, e.g., Report by the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, 1st Sess., Geneva, Apr. 30-May 3,
2001, at paras. 2-3, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/13 (May 23, 2001) (listing observers at
first IGC meeting); Report by the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, 2nd Sess., Geneva, Dec. 10-14,
2001, at paras. 3-4, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/16 (Dec. 14, 2001) (listing observers at
second IGC meeting).
44 TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 68.
45 Agreement Between the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade
Organization, Dec. 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 754.
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contained in TRIPS.4 6 In 1996, the CBD's Conference of the Parties
suggested a similar information sharing mechanism by which states parties
to both treaties would notify the TRIPS Council of laws and regulations
adopted to implement the Biodiversity Convention's intellectual property
provisions.
Examples of ad hoc institutional interactions are both more prevalent
and more theoretically interesting. Most informally, one organization can
unilaterally request another to review a specific subject area or consider a
particular perspective. In Decision V/26 on Access to Genetic Resources,
for example, the Conference of the Parties invited the WTO "to take into
account the fact that the provisions of [TRIPS and the CBD] are interrelated
and to further explore this relationship. '48 United Nations human rights
bodies have made similar unilateral requests, adopting resolutions that urge
the WTO to consider the human rights implications of TRIPS. 49 There is
no guarantee, of course, that the requested organizations will respond
favorably to these unsolicited requests.
C. Competition and Cooperation among Actors and Institutions
A more structured mode of cooperation occurs where one
intergovernmental organization submits information to another, either at the
request of the recipient organization or one of its member states. In 1999,
for example, the TRIPS Council requested written submissions from the
46 Id. at arts. 2(3) & 2(4); see also id. at art. 3 (implementing Article 6ter of the Paris
Convention for purposes of TRIPS); id. at art. 4 (legal-technical assistance to and technical
cooperation with developing countries).
47 See Convention on Biological Diversity, The Convention on Biological Diversity and
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS):
Relationships and Synergies, at para. 58(d), UNEP/CBD/COP/3/23 (Oct. 5, 1996).
Organizations can also jointly request information from states, as seen in the COP's request
to the CBD's Executive Secretary to undertake "with the help of other international and
intergovernmental organizations such as [WIPO] . . . further information gathering and
analysis" concerning access and benefit sharing issues. Decision VI/24, supra note 38, at
para. C (section title: "Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the Implementation of Access
and Benefit-sharing Arrangements).
48 Convention on Biodiversity, Decision V/26, Access to Genetic Resources, Fifth
Ordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, held at Nairoki, Kenya, May 15-26, 2000, at para. B(2), available at
http://www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.asp?lg=0&dec=V/26 (last visited Oct. 9, 2004).
49 2001 Sub-Commission Intellectual Property Resolution, supra note 40, at para. 12; see
also High Commissioner Report, supra note 40, para. 68 (encouraging ministerial meeting in
Doha to "consider establishing closer links between the promotion and protection of human
rights and the TRIPS Agreement").
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FAO and CBD relating to the Council's review of TRIPS Article 27.3(b).5°
The Council renewed and expanded its request after Doha, seeking
information from the secretariats of several intergovernmental
organizations concerning their activities related to Article 27.3(b), the
relationship between TRIPS and the CBD, and the protection of traditional
knowledge and folklore.51
More formal work programs can be established when two
organizations create a joint legislative agenda to regulate issues at the
interface of their jurisdictional mandates. In 2002, for example, the Sixth
Conference of the Parties to the CBD sought to enter into a "Memorandum
of Understanding" with WIPO to address the intellectual lroperty issues
raised by the Convention's traditional knowledge provisions.
Why would CBD member states seek such a memorandum? The
answer, at least in part, relates to a competition between the organizations
for primacy over a shared policy space. The CBD's Decision VL'20 on
Cooperation with Other Organizations, Initiatives and Conventions reflects
this competition. 3 It carves up the domain of genetic resources and
traditional knowledge between the two institutions. The decision
recognizes the preeminence of WIPO as "the lead specialized agency to
address intellectual property rights. '' 54 But in the politically contested area
of traditional knowledge, the Biodiversity Convention's members claimed
supremacy, stating that the CBD "is the primary international instrument
with the mandate to address" the biodiversity-related innovations of
50 See WTO Council for TRIPS, Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b), Information
from Intergovernmental Organizations, Addendum: FAO, IP/C/W/130/Add.2 (Apr. 12,
1999); WTO Council for TRIPS, Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b), Information
from Intergovernmental Organizations, Addendum: Secretariat of the Convention on
Biological Diversity, IP/CiW/130/Add. 1 (Mar. 16, 1999).
51 WTO Council for TRIPS, Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b), Relationship
Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity and Protection of
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Information from Intergovernmental Organizations,
Addendum: Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), IP/C/W/347/Add. 1, at para. 1 (June
10, 2002) (noting request for information from the CBD, CGIAR, FAO, UNCTAD, UNEP,
UPOV, WIPO, and the World Bank).
52 Convention on Biodiversity, Decision IV/9, Implementation of Article 86) and Related
Provisions, Fourth Ordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, held at Bratislava, Slovakia, May 4-15, 1998, at para. 17, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.asp?lg-0&dec=IV/9 (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
53 See Convention on Biodiversity, Decision VI/20, Cooperation with Other
Organizations, Initiatives and Conventions, Sixth Ordinary Meeting of the Conference of the
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, held at The Hague, Netherlands, Apr. 7-
19, 2002, available at http://www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.aspx?m=COP-
06&id=7194&lg=0 (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
54 Id. at para. 35.
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indigenous communities.55 Unless WIPO acquiesces in this division of
labor, however, there is no way to ensure that this claim of preeminence
will be respected.
Not all of the relationships between WIPO and the CBD are so
contentious. To the contrary, in the area of biodiversity-related
innovations, the two organizations have worked in harmony. To encourage
states to use patent applications to police the Biodiversity Convention's
access and benefit-sharing rules, the CBD Conference of the Parties asked
WIPO "to prepare a technical study" on whether additional patent
disclosure requirements would be "consistent with obligations in treaties
administered by [WIPO]," and "to report its findings to the [Conference]. 56
The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee responded favorably to this
request, adopting an accelerated work schedule that allowed it to draft the
technical study and present it to the WIPO General Assembly and then to
the Conference of the Parties in time for the seventh meeting of the
Conference in February 2004.57
IV Conclusion: The Politics of Regime Linkage
This essay has analyzed an important component of the increasingly
dense network of linkages and rules of relationship that the expanding
international intellectual property regime has engendered. The examples
55 Convention on Biodiversity, Decision VI/10, Article 8(j) and Related Provisions, Sixth
Ordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, held at The Hague, Netherlands, Apr. 7-19, 2002, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.aspx?m=COP-06&id=7184&lg=0 (last visited Oct.
4, 2004).
56 Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Certain Decisions of the Sixth Conference of the
Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/12,
Annex, at para. 4, (May 24, 2002). It is uncertain whether this invitation includes an
assessment by WIPO of the consistency of disclosure requirements with the TRIPS
Agreement. An earlier paragraph in the same document asks for the assistance of WIPO and
other international organizations in analyzing the "consistency and applicability of
requirements for disclosure of country of origin and prior informed consent in the context of
international legal obligations," without limiting those obligations to treaties administered by
WIPO. Decision VI/24, supra note 38 at para. C.3.c.
57 Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Certain Decisions of the Seventh Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity Concerning Access to
Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing: Memorandum of the Director General, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/l1 (March 5, 2004); Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Certain Decisions of
the Sixth Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/12 at 1-2 (May 24, 2002).
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discussed reveal that the shift of intellectual property lawmaking into new
venues has made the international legal landscape substantially more
complex. What began as a regime with a single intergovernmental
organization-WIPO-then became a bimodal regime with two
predominant organizations-the WTO and WIPO-and has now morphed
into a multi-modal or conglomerate regime populated by numerous
intergovernmental bodies and networks of regional and bilateral
agreements.
58
The consequences of this proliferation of venues for the future of the
international intellectual property regime are still unclear. Two divergent
evolutionary pathways are plausible. On the one hand, reviewing the same
legal and policy issues in multiple fora may produce delays, inefficiencies,
and inconsistent legal norms that inhibit regulatory solutions. On the other
hand, such review may ultimately lead to better outcomes by generating a
range of preliminary policy responses that prevents any a one organization
from prematurely locking in an equilibrium that is sub-optimal or biased
toward particular interest groups.
It is too early to make confident predictions about whether the benefits
of proliferation will outweigh its costs. Although the strategy of regime
shifting has opened up intellectual property lawmaking and dispute
settlement to new avenues of influence and enhanced opportunities to link
issue areas, it has also increased the likelihood of inconsistent obligations
for states and private parties. It is this danger of incoherence that is an
especially grave concern for an international legal system whose conflicts
rules engender more confusion than certainty, and whose courts and
tribunals are still relative neophytes at resolving the difficult issues that
such inconsistencies can engender.
58 See Leebron, supra note 20, at 10, 19 (describing the international trade regime as a
"conglomerate type of regime" consisting of "not only of the WTO and bilateral and
regional agreements and institutions, but also of informal consultative mechanisms and
expectations of behavior that occur on a plurilateral or bilateral basis"); see also Kal
Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT'L
ORG. 277 (2004) (examining the implications of the rising density of international
institutions).
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